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ABSTRACT: This paper deals with the prevailing formal model for knowledge in contempo-
rary economics, namely the state-space model introduced by Robert Aumann in 1976. In par-
ticular, the paper addresses the following question arising in this formalism: in order to state 
that an event is interactively or commonly known among a group of agents, do we need to as-
sume that each of them knows how the information is imparted to the others? Aumann an-
swered in the negative, but his arguments apply only to canonical, i.e., completely specified 
state spaces, while in most applications the state space is not canonical. This paper addresses 
the same question along original lines, demonstrating that the answer is negative for both ca-
nonical and not-canonical state spaces. Further, it shows that this result ensues from two coun-
terintuitive properties held by knowledge in the state-space model, namely Substitutivity and 
Monotonicity. 
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1    INTRODUCTION 
Models  of  economic  theory  are  peopled  by  agents  who  take  actions  on  the  basis  of  their 
knowledge and beliefs about the world, and about each other’s knowledge and beliefs. The 
prevailing formal model for knowledge in contemporary mainstream economics was intro-
duced by Robert Aumann in a seminal paper published in 1976.
1 Aumann’s basic idea is that 
an agent knows an event if, in every state of the world the agent considers possible, that event 
occurs. This idea is formalized in a set-theoretic setting where the knowledge of an agent be-
comes an operator  K  mapping subsets of the space of the states of the world W into other sub-
sets of  W. Aumann’s model of knowledge and the generalizations of his model have been 
variously  labeled  as  the  event-based  approach,  possibility  correspondence  model,  semantic 
formalism, knowledge space, Aumann structures, and state-space model of knowledge. The lat-
ter name will be adopted here. 
The state-space model makes it possible not only to represent what each agent knows 
about the world, but also what each agent knows about what other agents know about the 
world. This kind of knowledge – knowledge of what others know – is called interactive knowl-
edge. In strategic environments interactive knowledge has important consequences on the ac-
tions agents take. Consider Ann and Bob, who both observe a certain event E . For instance, E  
may be Ann’s effort in a principal-agent game or Ann’s planned output in a duopoly game. If 
Ann is uncertain whether Bob knows  E  she may choose a low effort (“Maybe Bob won’t find 
out”) or a low output (“I don’t know what Bob’s costs are or what he knows about my costs, so 
it’s better to keep my output low”). In contrast, if Ann knows that Bob knows  E , she will 
probably choose a high effort (“I’d better work hard, or he’ll fire me”) or a high output (“Well, 
I’m a Stakelberg leader, and Bob will adapt”). 
Given its strategic importance, it is fundamental to understand clearly how interactive 
knowledge  works  in  the  state-space  model.  At  an  intuitive  level,  it  seems  that  interactive 
knowledge of an event requires the additional assumption that agents know how information is 
imparted to the others: Ann needs to know how information is imparted to Bob in order to 
know that he knows  E , otherwise Ann would have no clue about what Bob knows. In fact, it 
turns out that in the state-space formalism interactive knowledge requires no additional as-
sumption about the knowledge of other agents’ informational structure. The first contribution 
of the present paper is to clarify what are the formal features of the knowledge operator  K  
provoking this counterintuitive behavior of interactive knowledge in the state-space model. 
In effect there are multiple levels of interactive knowledge. Level 1 is the one discussed 
above: it is about what each agent knows about what other agents know about the world. Level 
 
1  In philosophy the formal analysis of knowledge dates back to Hintikka (1962).   2 
2 is about what each agent knows about what other agents know about her/his knowledge of 
the world. The staircase of levels of interactive knowledge escalates in the predictable way. A 
specific kind of interactive knowledge is common knowledge. An event is said to be common 
knowledge among a group of agents if all know it, all know that all know it, and so on ad infi-
nitum.
2 
Besides interactive knowledge of level 1, interactive knowledge of higher levels and 
common knowledge are also of great consequence in strategic environments. For instance, con-
sider interactive knowledge of level 2: if Bob knows that Ann knows that he is able to observe 
her effort, Bob may think that Ann’s commitment to the firm is not sincere, and decide to fire 
her even if she works hard. As regards common knowledge, some elements of the game are 
typically assumed to be commonly known among the players, and this assumption has a key 
role in equilibrium analysis. More precisely, in games of complete information, the set of play-
ers,  the  set  of  strategies,  and  the  payoff  functions  are  assumed  to  be  common  knowledge 
among the players. In games of incomplete information, players usually have prior probability 
distributions  about the unknown  variables,  and  such  distributions  are  typically  taken  to  be 
common knowledge. Furthermore, some important game-theoretic solution concepts require 
that each player is rational, and that the rationality of the players is common knowledge among 
them.
3 Finally, common knowledge of posterior probabilities is essential for so-called “agree-
ing to disagree” results, and common knowledge of willingness to trade for no-trade theorems.
4 
When higher levels of interactive knowledge or common knowledge are involved, the 
question  about  the  knowledge  of  other  agents’  informational  structure  comes  out  again,  at 
higher levels. Level 2 of interactive knowledge of an event raises a question about level 1 of 
interactive knowledge: to say that Bob knows that Ann knows that he knows her effort, does 
Bob need to know that Ann knows how the information is imparted to him? More generally, if 
we consider level  n of interactive knowledge, level  ( 1) n-  of interactive knowledge of the 
agents’ informational structure seems to be involved, so that when common knowledge is at is-
sue the question becomes: to state that a certain event E  is common knowledge among a group 
of agents, do we need to assume that the way information is imparted to them is itself common 
knowledge? Again, even if the intuitive answer is in the affirmative, it turns out that in the 
state-space model common knowledge of an event requires no additional assumption about the 
 
2  To circumvent the infinitely recursive nature of this definition of common knowledge, a number of alternative 
characterizations of it have been proposed. On them, see Geanakoplos (1992, 1994) as well as Vanderschraaf 
and Sillari (2005). However, these alternative characterizations play no role in the current contribution. 
3  More on this in Brandenburger (1992, 2007); Dekel and Gul (1997); Battigalli and Bonanno (1999). 
4  The seminal paper for “agreeing to disagree” results is, again, Aumann (1976); for no-trade theorems it is Mil-
grom and Stokey (1982).   3 
agents’ knowledge of the way information is imparted to them. The second contribution of the 
paper is to show that the counterintuitive behavior of common knowledge in the state-space 
model originates from the same formal features of the knowledge operator  K  that provoke the 
counterintuitive behavior of interactive knowledge. 
The puzzles surrounding interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model 
have already been discussed by Aumann, but in a way that does not appear completely satisfac-
tory.
5 The main problem with Aumann’s arguments is that they affect only so-called canonical 
state spaces, that is, state spaces that are completely specified. However most applications em-
ploy a reduced state-space that is not canonical, so Aumann’s arguments do not apply. Whereas 
Aumann’s case is based on the notion of state of the world, the present paper addresses the 
topic along different lines. Its basic insight is a methodological distinction between the intui-
tive and philosophical understanding of knowledge on the one hand, and knowledge as mod-
eled in the state-space model through the operator  K  on the other. In effect,  K  possesses a 
number of properties that are at odds with both commonsense and the philosophical analysis of 
knowledge, and the counterintuitive behavior of interactive and common knowledge in the 
state-space  model  can  be  explained  by  two  of  these  properties,  namely  Substitutivity  and 
Monotonicity. Substitutivity says that, if two events  E  and  F collect the same states of the 
world, when the agent knows  E  she also knows  F . Although Substitutivity has attracted little 
attention among economists, it turns out to be not only a demanding property of  K  but also 
one that is intrinsic to any set-theoretic knowledge operator, so that it appears difficult to get 
rid of. Monotonicity states that, if event  E  is a subset of event  F , when the agent knows  E  
she also knows  F . Monotonicity is stronger than Substitutivity (the former implies the latter), 
and its unrealistic character has been thoroughly examined in the literature. Unlike Substitutiv-
ity, however, Monotonicity can be easily eliminated through minor modifications in the defini-
tion of the operator K . 
The paper shows that, when interactive and common knowledge are at issue, in some 
cases Substitutivity alone suffices to make superfluous any additional assumption about the 
agents’ knowledge of the way information is imparted to other agents. Moreover, whenever 
Substitutivity alone does not suffice, Monotonicity does. These results hold for both canonical 
and non-canonical state spaces, so that the present contribution may be seen as a completion of 
Aumann’s analysis. 
 
5  See in particular Aumann (1976, p. 1237; 1987, p. 9; 1999, pp. 272–3, 276–8; 2005, pp. 92–4). Other contribu-
tions to the discussion are Gilboa (1988); Brandenburger and Dekel (1993); Margalit and Yaari (1996); Hart, 
Heifetz and Samet (1996); Dekel and Gul (1997); Heifetz and Samet (1998); Heifetz (1999); Fagin, Geanakop-
los, Halpern and Vardi (1999); Aumann and Heifetz (2002, Appendix); Cubitt and Sugden (2003, Appendix 
2); Sent (2006).   4 
Some final specifications on scope and intended audience of the current contribution are 
in order.  First, in the philosophical discussion, one of the  characteristics that distinguishes 
knowledge from belief is that knowledge is assumed to be truthful while belief can be false. In 
fact, knowledge is traditionally defined by philosophers as “justified true belief”.
6 In the state-
space model, on the contrary, nothing prevents knowledge from being false, so that in fact the 
present paper covers not only knowledge but also belief. 
Second, an important subset of state-space models is partitional models. Since these have 
a number of nice properties (among other things, in them knowledge is always truthful), much 
of the literature focuses on them. Since neither Substitutivity nor Monotonicity depends on the 
conditions that make the state space partitional, the arguments made in the present paper hold 
for both partitional and non-partitional state-space models. 
Third, in the state-space model of knowledge, agents consider possible certain states of 
the world in W, and impossible the other states, but they are not endowed with probability dis-
tributions that represent their beliefs about W. If we first add to the model a probability distri-
bution for each agent, then introduce a belief operator  B  that identifies the probability as-
signed by an agent to any given event, and finally redefine knowledge as “belief with probabil-
ity 1”, we obtain a different model that is variously labeled as probabilistic belief space, prob-
abilistic structure or Harsanyi type space. There are a number of analogies between the state-
space model and the probabilistic belief space, and in particular the issue about interactive and 
common knowledge arising in the former has an analog in the latter. However, the answers to 
the issue diverge in the two formalisms. This is mainly due to the circumstance that in prob-
abilistic belief spaces the probability measures defining the belief operator  B  endow it with 
certain continuity properties that the knowledge operator  K  fails to have. Now, the present pa-
per deals only with interactive and common knowledge in the state-space model, and does not 
examine the analogous issue in probabilistic belief spaces.
7 
Fourth, the state-space model of knowledge employs set-theoretic tools that are familiar 
to economists. There is another model of knowledge, mainly elaborated by logicians and phi-
losophers, that employs the language and tools of logics and has been variously called the 
logic-based approach, the syntactic formalism, Kripke structure or simply epistemic logic.
8 The 
parallels between the state-space model and the logic-based approach have been explored by 
 
6  For an introduction to the definition of knowledge as “justified true belief”, and the refinements of this defini-
tion as a consequence of the so-called Gettier problem, see Steup (2006). 
7  On probabilistic belief spaces and their relationships to the state-space model, see Mertens and Zamir (1985); 
Monderer and Samet (1989); Brandenburger and Dekel (1993); Heifetz and Samet (1998, 1999a, 1999b); Bat-
tigalli and Bonanno (1999); Fagin, Geanakoplos, Halpern and Vardi (1999); Meier (2005); Mariotti, Meier and 
Piccione (2005). 
8  For a comprehensive presentation of the logic-based approach see Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1995).   5 
Michael Bacharach (1985) and Aumann himself (1989, 1999), among others. The logic-based 
formalism proved useful for understanding the properties of the knowledge operator  K  and 
has other nice features, but its language remains unfamiliar to many economists. Therefore, the 
focus of the present paper is on the state-space model, and the questions about interactive and 
common knowledge are tackled and answered within this model. 
Finally, the paper is addressed to all scholars dealing with formal models of knowledge 
and interested in the notion of common knowledge. In particular, economists may be glad to be 
reassured that no additional assumption is surreptitiously introduced into their models when an 
event is said to be interactively or commonly known among a group of agents. However, they 
may be surprised that this depends on reasons other than those put forward by the standard 
view moulded by Aumann’s arguments. Furthermore, they may be concerned that assumptions 
about interactive and common knowledge are dispensable thanks to properties of the operator 
K  that neither commonsense nor philosophy judges plausible. As regards philosophers, they 
may consider the state-space model of knowledge and its internal riddles as “an economist 
thing”.  However,  philosophers  in  the  analytic  tradition  are  familiar  with  formal  models  of 
knowledge, and common knowledge has become a major topic of research for them.
9 There-
fore, the internal puzzles of the state-space model (especially those involving common knowl-
edge) and the solution to those puzzles suggested here may be of interest for philosophers too. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the state-space model of knowledge. Sec-
tion 3 illustrates through an example the puzzles surrounding interactive knowledge in the 
state-space model. Section 4 discusses Aumann’s solution to the puzzle. Section 5 examines 
Substitutivity and Monotonicity. Section 6 shows that Substitutivity and Monotonicity are suf-
ficient  to  clarify  the  counterintuitive  behavior  of  interactive  knowledge  in  the  state-space 
model. Section 7 does the same for common knowledge. Section 8 sums up the paper. 
 
2  THE STATE-SPACE MODEL OF KNOWLEDGE 
Consider a set W whose generic element is w , and a correspondence  { } Æ ® W
W \ 2 : P  that as-
sociates to each element  W Î w  a set  ) (w P  of elements of  W (
W 2  is the set of all subsets of 
W).  Based  on  P ,  define  an  operator 
W W ® 2 2 : K   as  follows:  for  every  W Í E , 
{ } E P E K Í W Î = ) ( : ) ( w w .
10 
The interpretation of the above set-theoretic structure is the following. W is the set of the 
 
9  For an introduction to the philosophical research on common knowledge see Vanderschraaf and Sillari (2005) 
and the references cited there. 
10  This review of the state-space model of knowledge is based on Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chapter 5); 
Dekel and Gul (1997); Battigalli and Bonanno (1999); Samuleson (2004).   6 
possible states of the world. A state  W Î w  specifies all epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of 
the world that are relevant to the situation. The non-epistemic aspects of the world are those 
that do not involve the agents’ knowledge, that is, aspects such as “it rains” or “agent  i has 
transitive preferences”. In the literature, to indicate the whole of the non-epistemic aspects of 
the world the term nature is often used. The epistemic aspects of the world are those concern-
ing the agents’ knowledge about nature and about each other’s knowledge, e.g., aspects such as 
“agent i knows that it rains” or “agent  j  knows that agent i knows that it rains”. 
Only one state of the world is the true one, but the agent may be uncertain about which 
one. This uncertainty is modeled by a correspondence  P , which associates to each state w  the 
set of states that the agent regards as possible at w . This is why  P  is called a possibility corre-
spondence.
11 The possibility correspondence of an agent expresses formally the way informa-
tion is imparted to her. Notice however that possibility correspondences are just a tool that the 
external,  omniscient  model-maker  employs  to  encode  and  represent  the  agents’  epistemic 
states, not something that they are aware of. 
A subset  W Í E  is called an event, and can be thought of as the collection of all states 
that share a certain feature. For instance, the event “it rains” collects all states  W Î w  character-
ized by rain. Note that, if  E P Í ) (w , in all states the agent regards as possible in w , the event 
E  occurs. The operator  K  is interpreted as a knowledge operator: if  ) (E K Î w , then at w  the 
agent knows that the event  E  occurs, and this is because in every state the agent regards as 
possible in w  – that is, in  ) (w P  – the event  E  occurs. Observe that  ) (E K  is itself an event, 
the event “the agent knows  E ”. As such,  ) (E K  may become the object of further knowledge 
or uncertainty for another agent. 
As an illustration of the state-space model of knowledge, suppose that Ann is interested 
in a variable v that can take values from 1 to 6, like a die, and that each state of world is com-
pletely characterized by the value taken in it by v. This means that each state of world is com-
pletely characterized by its non-epistemic, or natural, aspects. Under these assumptions, there 
are six possible states of the world:  { } 6 5 4 3 2 1 , , , , , w w w w w w = W .  A P , the possibility correspon-
dence  of  Ann,  is  as  follows:  { } 2 1 2 1 , ) ( ) ( w w w w = = A A P P ,  = = = ) ( ) ( ) ( 5 4 3 w w w A A A P P P  
{ } 5 4 3 , , w w w ,  { } 6 6) ( w w = A P . So if  1 = v , Ann considers possible both  1 = v  and  2 = v ; if  3 = v , 
Ann is uncertain whether  3 = v ,  4 = v  or  5 = v , and so on. 
Let us now consider the event S  “v is not greater than 3”. S  occurs at states  1 w ,  2 w  and 
 
11  If  P   satisfies  the  following  two  properties:  (i)  for  every  wÎW,  ( ) P w w Î   and  (ii)  if  ' ( ) P w w Î , 
( ') ( ) P P w w = , then the state-space model is partitional. In particular, property (i) entails that knowledge is 
truthful.   7 
3 w :  { } 3 2 1 , , w w w = S . In which states of the world does Ann know  S ? Since only in  1 w  and  2 w  
( ) A P S w Í , Ann knows S  only in these two states:  { } 2 1, ) ( w w = S KA . Note that  ) (S K A  is itself 
an event: the event that Ann knows that  3 £ v . 
All this has an intuitive graphical representation. In Figure 1 below, the ovals stand for 
the sets  ) (w A P  representing Ann’s knowledge and uncertainty about the true state of the world, 
whereas the rectangles stand for events: 
 
 
For future reference, notice again that if the true state is  1 w  Ann knows S :  ) ( 1 S KA Î w . 
 
3  INTERACTIVE KNOWLEDGE: THE PUZZLE 
The state-space formalism can also be used to model interactive knowledge. The simplest set-
ting with two agents – Ann and Bob – will be considered here since this makes the discussion 
simpler without loss of generality. In this setting,  i P  and  i K , with  { } B A i , Î , are the possibility 
correspondence and the knowledge operator of Ann and Bob, respectively. 
Assume that Bob’s possibility correspondence is as follows:  { } 1 1) ( w w = B P ,  = ) ( 2 w B P  
{ } 3 2 3 , ) ( w w w = B P ,  { } 5 4 5 4 , ) ( ) ( w w w w = = B B P P ,  { } 6 6) ( w w = B P .  Consider  now  the  event  T  
“ 4 £ v ” that occurs at states  1 w ,  2 w ,  3 w  and  4 w :  = T  { } 4 3 2 1 , , , w w w w . It is easy to show that 
the states of the world where Bob knows that  4 £ v  are  1 w , 2 w  and  3 w :  { } 3 2 1 , , ) ( w w w = T KB . 
) (T KB  is itself an event, and in our example it happens that the event  S , “ 3 £ v ”, and the 
event  ) (T KB ,  “Bob  knows  that  4 £ v ”,  occur  exactly  in  the  same  states  of  the  world: 
S T KB = ) ( . This situation is represented in Figure 2: 
 
2 w   6 w   3 w   4 w   5 w  
S 
KA(S) 
1 w   Ann   8 
 
Hence, if the true state is  1 w  Bob knows T :  ) ( 1 T KB Î w . At this point, interactive knowledge 
enters the scene. We can ask whether at  1 w  Ann knows that Bob knows that  4 £ v . Since 
) (T KB  is itself an event, in the state-space formalism the question can be restated as follows: 
does  )) ( ( 1 T K K B A Î w ? 
From an intuitive viewpoint, the answer is that it depends on what Ann knows about the 
way information is imparted to Bob. If Ann knows that in  1 w  Bob is certain that  1 = v , and that 
in  2 w  Bob regards as possible both  2 = v  and  3 = v , then in  1 w  Ann can reason as follows: “I 
don’t know whether the true state is  1 w  or  2 w , but I’m sure that in both states Bob knows that 
4 £ v “. Therefore, Ann does indeed know that Bob knows T . On the contrary, if Ann does not 
know how information is imparted to Bob in  1 w  and  2 w , neither does she know what Bob 
knows in these two states, and so cannot conclude that Bob knows T . In other words, the intui-
tive answer is that we do need to make some additional assumption about Ann’s knowledge of 
Bob’s informational structure to state that at  1 w  she knows that Bob knows T . 
However, consider the following, formalist-oriented objection to this intuitive answer. It 
was established that at  1 w  Ann knows  S  (i.e.,  ) ( 1 S KA Î w ), and that the set of states where 
Bob knows  T  coincides with  S  (i.e.,  S T KB = ) ( ). But if  ) ( 1 S KA Î w  and  S T KB = ) ( , it is 
also the case that  )) ( ( 1 T K K B A Î w , that is, in fact at  1 w  Ann knows that Bob knows that  4 £ v . 
And this is independent of any additional assumption about Ann’s knowledge of the way in-
formation is imparted to Bob. 
Still, from the intuitive viewpoint there is an obvious reply to the formalist objection: if 
Ann does not know how information is imparted to Bob, she is not aware that  S T KB = ) ( , so 
that she cannot go from  ) (S KA  to  )) ( ( T K K B A . In other words, from Ann’s subjective view-
point,  S  and  ) (T KB  are different events. To say that, for Ann,  S  is subjectively equivalent to 
) (T KB , the additional assumption that Ann knows how information is imparted to Bob in  1 w  
and 2 w , is indeed necessary. 
2 w   6 w   3 w   4 w   5 w  
KB(T) = S 
1 w  
T 
Bob   9 
Which stance is correct, the intuitive or the formalist one? 
 
4  AUMANN’S SOLUTION TO THE PUZZLE 
Since in the state-space model the way information is imparted to agent  i is formally repre-
sented by his possibility correspondence  i P , one may think that our Ann-Bob puzzle reduces to 
the question whether at  1 w  Ann knows Bob’s possibility correspondence  B P , and that this 
question could be easily answered by checking whether  ) ( 1 B A P K Î w . The problem with this 
idea  is  that  the  knowledge  operator  K   applies  to  sets,  not  to  possibility  correspondences. 
Therefore,  the  very  expression  “knowledge  of  possibility  correspondences”  has  no  formal 
counterpart in the state-space model, and the expression  ) ( B A P K  is meaningless in it. This is 
not just a technical issue. At a methodological and more substantial level, the point is that pos-
sibility correspondences exist for the model-maker, not for the agents in the model. As ob-
served in Section 2, possibility correspondences are in fact just a tool that the modeler employs 
to encode and represent the agents’ epistemic states, not something that they are aware of or 
even know. Therefore, the idea of solving the Ann-Bob puzzle by framing it in the terms of 
Ann’s knowledge of Bob’s possibility correspondence risks mixing up the viewpoint of the 
modeler with that of the agents, and hence could be misleading. 
Since 1976 Aumann has proposed a different solution to the puzzle, which is based on 
the very notion of state of the world and goes as follows.
12 If the model is well specified, a 
state of the world should be a complete description of every epistemic and non-epistemic as-
pect of the world that is relevant to the situation. Therefore, a state of the world should contain 
also a description of the manner in which information is distributed among the agents when 
this is relevant to the situation. In our Ann-Bob example, assume for instance that at state  1 w  
Ann is uncertain about what Bob may know. Ann could think: “If  1 = v , there are two alterna-
tives: either Bob knows that  1 = v  or he wrongly believes that  6 = v . And I do not know which 
alternative  is  the  true  one”.  But  if  this  is  the  case,  our  Ann-Bob  model,  where 
{ } 6 5 4 3 2 1 , , , , , w w w w w w = W  and each state of the world is characterized only by non-epistemic 
aspects, is ill-specified. In the correct model, in fact, the state  1 w  should be split into two 
states:  ' 1 w  where  1 = v  and Bob is certain that  1 = v , and  ' ' 1 w  where  1 = v  and Bob wrongly 
believes that  6 = v . Accordingly, the state space  W should be expanded and Ann’s informa-
tional structure should be such that she cannot distinguish between  ' 1 w  and  ' ' 1 w . 
More generally, if in a state of the world agent i is uncertain about the way information 
 
12  See in particular Aumann (1976, p. 1237; 1987, p. 9).   10 
is imparted to agent  j , then that state should be broken into different states and  W should be 
expanded until the point where all uncertainty of agent i about the informational structure of  j  
is eliminated. Therefore, in the correct and complete state space  W, which is also called ca-
nonical, each agent knows by construction how the information is imparted to the other agents. 
But this knowledge “is not an assumption, but a ‘theorem’, a tautology; it is implicit in the 
model itself” (Aumann, 1987, p. 9), that is, it is the outcome of the way the canonical state-
space model, as an economist’s tool to represent appropriately both the nature and the agents’ 
epistemic states, is built up. 
There are two problems with Aumann’s solution to the Ann-Bob puzzle. The first and 
minor one, already pointed out by Aumann himself and others, is that in some situations the 
construction of the canonical  W is precluded because no number of state splits is sufficiently 
large to exhaust all interactive uncertainty of the agents. In particular, this happens when no 
number of sentences is sufficiently large to describe the agents’ interactive uncertainty. How-
ever, these situations appear to be quite peculiar so that they do not affect Aumann’s solution 
to the puzzle in a significant way.
13 
The second problem has received little attention in the literature but in my opinion is the 
major one. Aumann’s solution to the Ann-Bob puzzle requires that the interaction among the 
agents is modeled by using the canonical state-space. However most applications employ a re-
duced state-space, in which the states describe only the non-epistemic aspects of the situation 
at issue, and therefore are in fact just states of nature rather than states of the world. Reduced 
models are used because as soon as one attempts to split the states of nature in order to elimi-
nate interactive uncertainty and construct the canonical  W, the state-space formalism loses its 
simplicity and tractability, and becomes a cumbersome machinery. In effect, also our formal 
representation of the Ann-Bob interaction is a reduced model: the six states  1 6 w w -  represent 
only the different values the die can take, and the possibility correspondences of Ann and Bob 
express their uncertainty about these values alone, not about the other’s epistemic states. 
If the agents have no kind of interactive uncertainty about the epistemic states of the oth-
ers, then the reduced model is also canonical, and Aumann’s arguments work fine. However, 
when the model is not canonical Aumann’s case does not apply and the puzzle returns: to say 
that at state of nature  1 w  Ann knows that Bob knows that  4 £ v , is any additional assumption 
about Ann’s knowledge of the way information is imparted to Bob necessary? The answer put 
forward in the present paper is in the negative: the properties of Substitutivity and Monotonic-
 
13  More on the cases where the construction of the canonical W is problematical in Aumann (1989, 1999); Hart, 
Heifetz and Samet (1996); Heifetz and Samet (1998); Heifetz (1999); Fagin, Geanakoplos, Halpern and Vardi 
(1999); Aumann and Heifetz (2002, Appendix).   11 
ity that the knowledge operator  K  holds by construction in the state-space model, make any 
additional assumption dispensable, and this not only in canonical state-space models, but also 
in reduced ones. This conclusion is in accord with Aumann’s, and the present contribution may 
in fact be seen as a completion of his case when non-canonical state spaces are involved. Let us 
now examine in more detail Substitutivity and Monotonicity. 
 
5  SUBSTITUTIVITY AND MONOTONICITY 
The state-space model of knowledge makes knowledge easy to handle in economic models, 
and captures certain features of the intuitive and philosophical understanding of knowledge. In 
effect, the idea that we know a fact when this fact takes place in any situation we consider pos-
sible sounds sensible. On the other hand, the definition of knowledge through  K  implies some 
properties of knowledge that appear too demanding from the intuitive and philosophical view-
point, and have been discussed in the philosophical, economic and artificial intelligence litera-
ture under the banner of the logical omniscience problem. The present paper focuses on two 
properties  of  K :  Monotonicity,  which  has  already  attracted  considerable  attention  among 





Substitutivity states that, if two events collect exactly the same states of the world, when the 
agent knows one event she also knows the other. Formally: 
 
Substitutivity: if  F E = , then  ) ( ) ( F K E K = . 
 
Although Substitutivity may appear a quite natural property of knowledge, a brief aside on the 
philosophical notions of extension and intension will show that it is not.
15 
Arguably since Medieval discussions about the status of universals, philosophers have 
recognized that there is a difference between what a linguistic expression designates and what 
it means. What a linguistic expression designates consists of a set of things to which the ex-
pression applies, and has been labeled as denotation by John Stuart Mill (1843), reference by 
Gottlob Frege (1892), and extension by Rudolf Carnap (1947). Carnap’s terminology has be-
 
14  On the logical omniscience problem, see the references cited in note 10, as well as Dekel, Lipman and Rus-
tichini (1998) and Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1995, Chapter 9). On Substitutivity in particular, see 
Bacharach (1986) and Vilks (1995, 2007). In the logic-based approach Substitutivity is usually called the 
Equivalence Rule. Lismont and Mongin (1994, 2003), as well as Ferrante (1996), have introduced logical 
models of knowledge that are based on so-called Montague-Scott or neighbourhood semantics, and where, at 
least to a certain extent, Monotonicity is replaced with the weaker Equivalence Rule. 
15  This aside is largely based on Bealer (1998); Christmas (1998); Fitting (2007).   12 
come standard in contemporary philosophy and will be adopted here. So, for instance, the ex-
tension of the term “computer” is the set of existing computers. What a linguistic expression 
means is the notion or idea conveyed by the expression, and has been called connotation by 
Mill, sense by Frege, and intension by Carnap. The intension of “computer” is the idea of an 
electronic machine that can store, retrieve, and process data. 
Two expressions can have the same extension but different intensions. Frege proposed 
the example of the morning star, which is the star that can be seen at sunrise, and the evening 
star, the star that appears at sunset. The morning star and the evening star have different inten-
sions but the same extension, since both designate the planet Venus. Other expressions with 
different intensions but equal extension are “51” and “17 ´ 3”, or “equilateral triangle” and 
“equiangular triangle”. 
In certain contexts, extensional equality is sufficient to apply the so-called principle of 
substitutivity, according to which equals can be substituted by equals in any statement without 
modifying the truth-value of the statement. Contexts where substitution of equals requires only 
extensional equality are called extensional contexts. Classical logic, mathematics and standard 
set theory, that is, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, are typical instances of extensional contexts. 
Contexts in which intension also matters, and in which extensional equality alone does not 
warrant the principle of substitutivity, are called intensional contexts. Typical examples of in-
tensional contexts are statements involving verbs of propositional attitude such as “believes”, 
“wants”, “knows”. For instance, even if Ann knows that the morning star is Venus, she may 
not know that the evening star is also Venus. Even if Bob knows that the triangle in front of 
him is equilateral he may not know that it is also equiangular. 
One could think that the failure of the substitutivity principle in these two examples is 
due to the fact that the extensional equality among the expressions involved is only accidental, 
that is, non necessary: equilateral and equiangular triangles coincide in Euclidean geometry but 
may differ in some non-Euclidean system. Similarly, the evening star and the morning star are 
the same in the actual astronomical universe, but may be different in another possible universe. 
In effect, the principle of substitutivity can fail even when extensional equality is necessary, 
that is, holds in every imaginable universe. For instance, even if it is always the case that 17 ´ 
3 = 51, Carl may know that 17 ´ 3 is not prime but not know that 51 is not prime. Logical sys-
tems developed for intensional contexts are called intensional logics. Even if a number of in-




16  The main systems of intensional logic are those proposed by Carnap (1947); Church (1951); Montague (1960, 
1970); Gallin (1975); Zalta (1988).   13 
Going back to the state-space model, here we do not find linguistic expressions but sub-
sets of  W called events. However, we have seen that events are typically interpreted as set-
theoretic images of linguistic expressions like “it rains”, “v is not greater than 3”, or “Bob 
knows that v is not greater than 4”. According to this interpretation, the extension of an event 
is the set of states of  W constituting the event, whereas its intension is identified with the in-
tension of the linguistic expression represented by the event, e.g., the intension of “it rains”. 
Now, the problem with Substitutivity as a property of the knowledge operator  K  is that 
it says that extensional equality ( F E = ) is sufficient to apply the substitutivity principle and 
deduce that  ) ( ) ( F K E K = : if Ann knows that the morning star is Venus, she must also know 
that the evening star is Venus. This means that in the state-space model, the contexts involving 
knowledge are purely extensional, and that the operator  K  misses the intensional dimension 
that both philosophy and commonsense recognize in actual knowledge. 
In particular, in contexts involving interactive knowledge the extensional nature of  K  
has an even more striking consequence: it entails that an agent may know what an other agent 
knows, even if the former has no clue about the way information is imparted to the latter. In 
fact, if a generic event  E  and event  ( ) i K F  concerning agent i’s knowledge are extensionally 
equal, Substitutivity applies with no need of additional assumptions, so that if agent  j  knows 
E  she also knows that agent i knows F . We will see this happening in the Ann-Bob puzzle. 
Note that Substitutivity draws from the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory and the 
circumstance that  K  operates on sets, rather than from the specific way  K  is defined in the 
state-space model, that is, as  { } E P E K Í W Î = ) ( : ) ( w w . In fact, as far as  K  has sets as its 
domain, and set  E  is equal to set  F , it must be that  ) ( ) ( F K E K = , and this independently of 
the proposed definition of  K .
17 Therefore, Substitutivity turns out to be a fundamental prop-
erty of any set-theoretic knowledge operator, that is, a property that cannot be removed by 
modifications of the standard  K . This also means that any set-theoretic knowledge operator 
tacitly endows the agent with epistemic capabilities that appear problematic in the economic 
and philosophical interpretations of the state-space model. 
 
5.2 Monotonicity 
Monotonicity states that, if event  E  is a subset of event  F , when an agent knows  E  she also 
knows F . Formally: 
 
 
17  Notice that Substitutivity is also independent of the two properties of  P  that make the state-space partitional 
and were mentioned in note 11.   14 
Monotonicity: if  F E Í , then  ) ( ) ( F K E K Í .
18 
 
Clearly, when Monotonicity holds, so does Substitutivity. Monotonicity is usually interpreted 
as stating that the agent knows the implications of what she knows. This means that if the agent 
knows the axioms of a mathematical system, she also knows all the theorems that are valid in 
the system, and this appears at odds with ordinary intuitions about knowledge and the logical 
abilities of human beings. Here a slightly different interpretation of Monotonicity is suggested, 
which proves helpful in clarifying the counterintuitive behavior of interactive and common 
knowledge in the state-space model. 
According to the usual interpretation, Monotonicity seems to deal with the deductive ca-
pacities of the agent, so that it enters the scene only when the agent knows something and re-
mains silent otherwise. If the agent does not know the axioms of the system, Monotonicity has 
nothing to say about what theorems she knows. However, Monotonicity is much more perva-
sive. In fact, at any state w  the agent knows and cannot avoid knowing the event  ) (w P , that is, 
the event collecting all the states she regards as possible at  w . By Monotonicity, she also 
knows and cannot avoid knowing all the events that include  ) (w P , i.e., all the events that are 
supersets of  ) (w P . Therefore, Monotonicity enters the scene at any w , and implies that there 
is always a number of events that the agent knows and cannot avoid knowing, namely  ) (w P  
and its supersets. In a sense, at  w   ) (w P  and its supersets make themselves manifest to the 
agent. 
In the economic literature, this epiphanic character of  K  has been noticed (and exploited 
for a number of results) with reference to a particular class of events called self-evident events 
or truisms.
19 An event E  is said to be self-evident if, for every  E Î w ,  E P Í ) (w . Therefore, if 
E  is a self-evident event and  E Î w , then it is also the case that  ) (E K Î w , i.e.  ) (E K E Í . In 
words, whenever a self-evident event occurs the agent knows and cannot avoid knowing it. The 
interpretation of Monotonicity proposed here highlights that the epiphanic character of  K  is 
not restricted to self-evident events, since in any state w  there is a number of events that are 
immediately and necessarily known by the agent, namely  ) (w P  and its supersets. 
Note that among the events that make themselves manifest to the agent, there may also 
be events concerning the knowledge of other agents. Since Monotonicity implies Substitutivity, 
 
18  To see why Monotonicity holds when  { } ( ) : ( ) K E P E w w = ÎW Í , note that if  ( ) K E wÎ  then  ( ) P E w Í . If 
E F Í , it is also the case that  ( ) P F w Í , and hence  ( ) K F wÎ . Notice that Monotonicity, like Substitutivity, 
does not depend on the two properties of  P  that make the state-space partitional and were mentioned in note 
11. 
19  See e.g. Milgrom (1981), Geanakoplos (1992, 1994) and Binmore and Brandenburger (1989).   15 
under Monotonicity, the epistemic capabilities of the agent already entailed by Substitutivity 
cannot become weaker. In effect, under Monotonicity these capabilities become even stronger: 
agent  j  will know that agent i knows event F  not only when  ( ) i K E  and  ( ) i E K F = , but also 
whenever  ( ) i E K F Í . 
From a philosophical viewpoint it can be argued that certain events related to sensations 
(e.g. “I see this object as white”) or thoughts (e.g. the Cartesian “I am thinking” or the analyti-
cal truth “A is A”) are immediately and necessarily known, and that any knowledge ultimately 
relies on this kind of event. However, in most real-world circumstances knowledge refers to 
states of affairs that do not make themselves manifest, and this certainly holds for mental states 
of other individuals. Therefore, even in the interpretation proposed here Monotonicity appears 
an unrealistic property of  K . Moreover, to Monotonicity apply all criticisms of the extensional 
nature of  K  discussed in relation to Substitutivity. It can be added that Dekel, Lipman and 
Rustichini (1998) have also shown that Monotonicity is incompatible with our intuitions about 
a feature of actual knowledge that is relevant for economic analysis, namely that an agent may 
be unaware of some possible events. 
Unlike Substitutivity, however, Monotonicity can be easily ruled out by slightly modify-
ing the standard definition of the knowledge operator  K . Consider for instance a mapping 
2 : 2 X
W
W ® , that associates to each state  w  a collection of subsets of  W.  X  may be inter-
preted as a “comprehension correspondence” that associates to each  w  the events that the 
agent  is  able  to  figure  out  in  w .  ( ) K E   may  then  be  defined  as  follows: 
{ } ( ) : ( )  &  ( ) K E P E E X w w w = ÎW Í Î ,  whereby  ( ) P w   is  the  customary  possibility  corre-
spondence.
20 The interpretation of this modified knowledge operator is that knowing an event 
requires not only that the event occurs in every state the agent regards as possible, but also that 
the agent can figure out the event at issue. For instance, if at  1 w  Bob is not able to figure out 
the meaning of “odd number”, although in all states he regards as possible at  1 w  the value of 
the die is odd, Bob does not know that it is. So, if  { } 1 3 5 , , O w w w =  is the event “v is an odd 
number”,  1 ( ) B O X w Ï ,  so  that  1 ( ) B K O w Ï ,  although  1 ( ) B P O w Í .  Whereas  Substitutivity 
holds also for this modified knowledge operator, Monotonicity does not:  F E Í  and  ( ) K E  no 
longer imply  ( ) K F , since it may be that  ( ) E X w Î  but  ( ) F X w Ï . 
 
6  INTERACTIVE KNOWLEDGE 
Let us now return to the Ann-Bob puzzle: is any additional assumption about Ann’s knowledge 
 
20  This definition of  K  is largely inspired by Fagin, Halpern, Moses and Vardi (1995, Chapter 9).   16 
of Bob’s informational structure necessary for Ann to know that Bob knows that  4 £ v , i.e., the 
event  ) (T KB , at  1 w ? The intuitive answer was “Yes”: even if at  1 w  Ann knows  S , i.e., that 
3 £ v , and  S T KB = ) ( , if Ann does not have any clue about the way information is imparted to 
Bob, she is not aware that  S T KB = ) ( , so that she cannot go from knowing  S  to knowing 
) (T KB . 
The analysis of Substitutivity put forward in Section 5.1 makes clear that this answer is 
erroneous. The error derives from interpreting the operator  K  on the basis of the commonsen-
sical and philosophical understanding of knowledge, according to which intension matters. In 
fact, for both commonsense and philosophy even if  S  and  ) (T KB  are extensionally equal, 
their intensional difference (“ 3 £ v ” is intensionally different from “Bob knows that  4 £ v ”) 
does not allow Ann to jump from  ) (S K A  to  )) ( ( T K K B A . However,  K  is not an exact copy of 
actual knowledge, and in particular  K  obliterates the intensional dimension of knowledge. 
Therefore, the extensional equality of S  and  ) (T KB  is indeed sufficient to apply Substitutivity 
and go from  ) (S K A  to  )) ( ( T K K B A , and this without any additional assumption about Ann’s 
knowledge of Bob’s informational structure. 
To this line of reasoning one may object that the Ann-Bob puzzle and its solution refer to 
a particular case, namely the one where  S T KB = ) (  and Substitutivity applies. In effect, in gen-
eral Substitutivity does not suffice, and the stronger Monotonicity is needed. For instance, con-
sider event V  “ 5 ¹ v ” that occurs at all states except  5 w :  { } 6 4 3 2 1 , , , , w w w w w = V . It is easy to 
show  that  { } 6 3 2 1 , , , ) ( w w w w = V KB ,  so  that  ( ) B K V S ¹   and  Substitutivity  is  ruled  out.  This 
situation is represented in Figure 3 below: 
 
Here  at  1 w   Bob  knows  that  5 ¹ v .  Moreover,  since  { } { } 1 1 2 1 2 3 6 ( ) , , , , A P w w w w w w w = Í = 
( ) B K V , at  1 w  Ann knows that Bob knows that  5 ¹ v :  1 ( ( )) A B K K V w Î . Does this require any 
additional assumption about Ann’s knowledge of the way information is imparted to Bob? If 
2 w   6 w   3 w   4 w   5 w  
 
1 w  
V 
S 
Bob   17 
we think of the interpretation of Monotonicity suggested in Section 5.2, we see that this is not 
the case. In effect, since  1 ( ) ( ) A B P K V w Í , at  1 w  the fact that Bob knows that  5 ¹ v  makes it-
self manifest to Ann: Ann knows and cannot avoid knowing that Bob knows that  5 ¹ v , and 
again this happens without any additional assumption about Ann’s knowledge of Bob’s infor-
mational structure. 
All this holds not only for event V , or the Ann-Bob pair: for any two agents i and  j , if 
at w  i knows event  E , i.e.  ( ) i K E wÎ , and in all states  j  regards as possible at w  it happens 
that  i knows  E , i.e.,  ( ) ( ) j i P K E w Í , then  j  knows that  i knows  E :  ( ( )) j i K K E wÎ . This 
does not require any additional assumption about  j ’s knowledge of the way information is 
imparted to  i, since by Monotonicity event  ( ) i K E  makes itself manifest to  j . This clarifies 
the counterintuitive behavior of interactive knowledge in the state-space model. 
 
7  COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
As stated in the Introduction, an event is said to be common knowledge among a group of 
agents if all know it, all know that all know it, and so on, ad infinitum. Within the state-space 
model, an event  E  is said to be common knowledge between Ann and Bob in the state of the 
world w  – this is written as  ) (E CKAB Î w  – if at w  Ann knows  E  in the sense of the operator 
K , Bob knows  E  in the sense of  K , Ann knows that Bob knows  E  in the sense of  K , and so 
on.  Formally,  ) (E CKAB Î w   if  w   belongs  to  every  set  of  the  infinite  sequence  ) (E KA , 
) (E KB ,  )) ( ( E K K B A ,  )) ( ( E K K A B ,  ))) ( ( ( E K K K A B A ,  ))) ( ( ( E K K K B A B ,… 
If we look at this definition of common knowledge with the previous discussion in mind, 
it is natural to ask whether any additional assumption about common knowledge of their in-
formational structures is required to state that event  E  is common knowledge between Ann 
and Bob. As in the case of interactive knowledge, the answer is in the negative. More specifi-
cally, sometimes it suffices to bring into play Substitutivity, whereas in general Monotonicity 
is needed. 
To see that sometimes Substitutivity suffices, consider the event W  “ 6 = v ”, which oc-
curs only at  6 w :  { } 6 w = W . At  6 w , both Ann and  Bob know  W , since  6 6 ( ) ( ) A B P P w w = = 
{ } 6 W w Í . Note that  6 w  is also the only state where Ann and Bob know W , so that the events 
“ 6 = v ”,  “Ann  knows  that  6 = v ”,  and  “Bob  knows  that  6 = v ”  have  the  same  extension: 
W W K W K B A = = ) ( ) ( . Hence Substitutivity applies, so that Ann and Bob reach level 1 of in-
teractive  knowledge:  at  6 w   Ann  (Bob)  knows  that  Bob  (Ann)  knows  that  6 = v : 
6 ( ( )) A B K K W w Î  and  6 ( ( )) B A K K W w Î . As explained in Section 6, this step does not involve   18 
any additional assumption about the knowledge each player has about the informational struc-
ture of the other. 
In effect, since  ( ) B K W W = , the set where Ann knows that Bob knows that  6 = v , is 
again W , and the same holds for Bob:  ( ( )) ( ( )) A B B A K K W K K W W = = . Hence, Substitutivity 
applies again, and level 2 of interactive knowledge is reached: at  6 w  Ann (Bob) knows that 
Bob  (Ann)  knows  that  she  (he)  knows  that  6 = v :  6 ( ( (( ))) A B A K K K W w Î   and 
6 ( ( (( ))) B A B K K K W w Î . This step involves no additional assumptions about level 1 of interac-
tive knowledge of the agents’ informational structure. 
In  effect,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  for  each  { } , i A B Î   and  j i ¹ ,  we  have  that 
( ( ( ) ) i j i i K K K K W W ××× ××× = ,  so  that  by  Substitutivity  6 ( ( ( ) ) i j i i K K K K W w Î ××× ××× ,  which 
means that at  6 w  it is common knowledge among Ann and Bob that  6 = v . Again, no step up 
this infinite staircase of interactive knowledge of  W  involves additional assumptions about 
lower levels of interactive knowledge of the way information is imparted to the agents. We can 
interpret this result in the sense that Substitutivity makes the entire hierarchy of “I know that 
you know that I know… that  6 = v ” transparent for both Ann and Bob. 
More generally, if at state w  event  E  is common knowledge between agent i and agent 
j , by the very definition of common knowledge  ( ) i P w  belongs to the infinite sequence  E , 
( ) j K E ,  ( ( )) j i K K E ,  ( ( ( ))) j i j K K K E ,… Therefore, by Monotonicity, agent  i knows and can-
not  avoid  knowing  all  the  events  in  the  sequence.  In  a  sense,  E ,  ( ) j K E ,  ( ( )) j i K K E , 
( ( ( ))) j i j K K K E ,…  make  themselves  manifest  to  i.  Similarly,  E ,  ( ) i K E ,  ( ( )) i j K K E , 
( ( ( ))) i j i K K K E ,… make themselves manifest to  j . Hence, to state that  E  is common knowl-
edge between i and  j , no additional assumption about common knowledge of their informa-
tional structure is required. 
 
8  CONCLUSION 
This paper shows that, contrary to intuitive interpretations, in the state-space model interactive 
and common knowledge of an event do not entail additional assumptions about the knowledge 
agents have about the way information is imparted to others. This result is obtained by bringing 
into play Substitutivity, and sometimes the stronger Monotonicity, and holds for both canonical 
and non-canonical state spaces, as well as for partitional and non-partitional ones. When Sub-
stitutivity alone is involved, the result is robust even to modifications in the standard definition 
of K , since any set-theoretic knowledge operator satisfies Substitutivity. 
The result is counterintuitive because neither commonsense nor philosophy regards Sub-  19 
stitutivity and Monotonicity as plausible properties of actual knowledge. The original insight of 
the present contribution is in fact a methodological distinction between knowledge as under-
stood by philosophy and commonsense on the one hand, and knowledge as modeled in the 
state-space formalism through the operator  K  on the other. When we keep in mind this meth-
odological  distinction,  the  counterintuitive  behavior  of  interactive  knowledge  and  common 
knowledge in the state-space model becomes intelligible. 
This conclusion leaves us with the question about the relevance of the state-space model 
of knowledge: if the model necessarily endows the agents with implausible epistemic capabili-
ties like those implied by Substitutivity and Monotonicity, to what extent is it useful for study-
ing interactions among real agents? Or, to put the same question in more fashionable terms: if 
“an interpretation is a mapping which links a formal theory with everyday language” (Rubin-
stein, 1991, p. 909), what interpretations of the state-space model of knowledge are interesting 
and/or useful for economists and philosophers? Although the answer to this question is beyond 
the scope of the current paper, the analysis presented here shows the need for generalizations of 
the standard state-space model that could accommodate more realistic formal treatments of 
knowledge. In effect, a number of such generalizations have already been proposed, especially 
in order to overcome the circumstance that the standard state-space model precludes unaware-
ness.
21 The task of examining what happens to Substitutivity and Monotonicity in these gener-
alizations of the standard state-space will be left for future research. 
 
 
21  See, among others, Modica and Rustichini (1999); Halpern (2001); Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (2006); Li 
(2006); Galanis (2007).   20 
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